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Summary findings
Consolidation of the banking industry is shifting assets  Their results suggest that large and foreign-owned
into larger institutions that often operate in many  institutions may have difficulty extending relationship
nations. Large international financial institutions are  loans to opaque small firms, especially if small businesses
geared toward serving large wholesale customers. How  are delinquent in repaying their loans.
does this affect the banking system's ability to lend to  Bank distress resulting from lax prudential supervision
informationally opaque small businesses?  and regulation appears to have no greater effect on small
Berger, Klapper, and Udell test hypotheses about the  borrowers than on large borrowers,  although even small
effects of bank size, foreign ownership, and distress on  firms may react to bank distress by borrowing from
lending to informationally opaque small firms, using a  multiple banks, despite raising borrowing costs and
rich new data set on Argentinean banks, firms, and loans.  destroying some of the benefits of exclusive lending
They also test hypotheses about borrowing from a single  relationships.
bank versus borrowing from several banks.
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abergerAilfb.gov.I.  Introduction
An important role of banks is to provide relationship lending services that help resolve
problems in providing external finance to informationally opaque small businesses.  However, a
number of factors may affect the banking system's ability to provide  credit to relationship-dependent
borrowers in the future.  Banking industry consolidation creates large banks that may be oriented
toward transactions lending and providing capital market services to large corporate clients.  These
institutions are also often headquartered at great distances from small business customers and may
have difficulty processing locally-based, and  often  less quantitative, relationship  information.
International  consolidation  may compound this problem  by creating  a distant owner  that operates  from
an entirely different banking environment.  Bank financial distress may also be an  important
determinant  of credit availability, es evidenced by the credit crunch in the U.S. and the financial  crises
in East Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere.
These factors raise policy concerns about the effects of bank mergers and acquisitions
(M&As), foreign entry, and prudential supervision  and regulation  on the supply  of relationship  credit.
This paper tries to shed light on these issues by testing hypotheses about the effects of bank size,
foreign bank ownership, and bank distress on lending to informationally opaque small businesses.
Previous  research has examined  the effects of bank size on small business lending, but there has been
very little study of the effects of foreign ownership and distress on lending to small businesses.  l
Instead, the prior literature has focused on the effects of foreign  ownership and distress on the total
business lending of the banks. We provide a relatively complete  analysis in which the effects of bank
size, foreign ownership,  and bank distress are examined  and compared using a data set that enables  us
to focus on informationally  opaque small businesses.
We also examine a related set of issues regarding the opacity of small businesses and their
ability to obtain bank credit - the choice between borrowing  from a single bank versus multiple  banks.
Specifically,  we test related secondary hypotheses about the extent to which the single-bank-versus-
1  Foreign  ownership  is  defined  as a branch  or subsidiary  whose  head  office  is  located  abroad  or in  which  at least
50%  of its capital  is foreign-owned.
1multiple-bank  decision depends on the infornational opacity  of the firm versus  the financial  distress  of
its primary  bank. This may help reveal whether firms borrow from multiple  banks principally  to avoid
the exploitation  of market  power versus to avoid the possible withdrawal  of credit by distressed banks.
The extent to which firms borrow from multiple banks to avoid bank distress-related  problems also
highlights the social costs of lax prudential supervision and regulation, which may result in costly
multiple  banking arrangements and loss of benefits from exclusive  relationships. There are only a few
prior studies on the single-bank-versus-multiple-bank  issue.
We use a rich, new data set assembled in part from the Central Bank of Argentina's Central
de Deudores or central credit registry, which contains information on individual businesses, their
loans, and the identities of their banks. This information is combined with data on the balance sheet
and income statements of the individual banks taken from other Central Bank sources.  In all, we
employ data on 61,295 firms with 195,695  total loans from 1  15 different  banks as of the end of 1998.
The data set allows a relatively complete look at the circumstances under which firms borrow from
large versus small banks, foreign-owned versus domestically-owned banks, and distressed versus
healthy banks, as well as an analysis of which firms borrow from a single bank versus multiple
banks.2
Section II reviews the role of banks in relationship lending and gives our main and secondary
hypotheses.  Section II also reviews the extant empirical literature that has tested these and related
hypotheses.  In Section III, we give some background information about the Argentinean banking
system.  Section IV describes the data set and gives our methodology for testing the hypotheses.
Section V presents our empirical results. We draw some tentative conclusions in Section VI.
II.  The Role of Banks. Hypotheses to be Tested. and Associated Literature
II.a.  The Role of Banks in Relationship Lending
Under relationship lending, information is gathered by the lender beyond the relatively
transparent data available in the financial  statements and other sources readily  available at the time of
2 This  data set  is similar  to  the Italian  Central  Credit  Register,  which  has  been  used  to address  similar  questions
(e.g.,  Bonaccorsi  di Patti and Gobbi  2000,  Detragiache,  Garella,  and Guiso  2000)).
2origination. The information is gathered through contact over time with the firm, its owner, and its
local community on a variety of dimensions. The lender may gather data from the provision of past
loans and other services to the business. Information may also be garnered from contact with the
borrower's customers and suppliers, and from the lender's knowledge of the borrower's interaction
with the local community.  This information is used in making additional decisions over time
regarding renewals,  additional loans, renegotiations, and monitoring strategies, and is not shared  with
other potential lenders. The production of relationship information  is costly,  and the costs  are likely  to
be passed on to the relationship borrowers.  We expect informationally opaque firms to be more
willing to absorb these costs in order to obtain additional external financing and/or more favorable
terms.
At the opposite end of the spectrum is pure transactions lending, under which due diligence
and contract terms are based on information  that is relatively  easily  available  at the time of origination.
Each transaction stands  on its own in  the sense that information  from the relationship,  if any, between
the lender and the borrower is substantially irrelevant.3
Theory suggests that financial intermediaries  may have comparative  advantages  in delivering
relationship lending in their role as delegated monitors.  Empirical evidence suggests that one
particular intermediary,  the commercial  bank, may be best suited for this role.  The vast majority of
small businesses identify commercial  banks as their primary  financial  institutions,  and these businesses
typically stay with the same bank for many years.  Commercial banks provide a broad range of
financial services needed by small businesses, and small businesses tend to cluster their purchases of
these services in a single, primary bank with a nearby office. As a result, the primary bank can cull
information  about borrower creditworthiness  from providing both lending services and other types of
services, including deposits, trust services, investment management, and payroll processing.4
Empirical evidence also generally suggests that banking relationships affect the pricing and
availability  of credit, and that small businesses benefit  from these relationships. Stronger  relationships
3 Transactions  lending  encompasses  several different  lending  technologies,  including  fnancial statement
lending,  relationship  lending,  asset-based  lending,  and  credit  scoring  and similar  quantitative  techniques.
4 See Berger  and  Udell (1998)  for a discussion  of the empirical  literature  that  reports  these  findings.
3(strength measured in various ways) are empirically associated with lower loan interest rates (Berger
and Udell 1995,  Harhoff and Korting 1998, Scott and Dunkelberg 1999, Degryse and van Cayseele
2000), reduced collateral  requirements (Berger  and Udell 1995,  Harhoff and Korting 1998a,  Scott  and
Dunkelberg 1999), greater debt seniority for the relationship lenders (Longhofer and Santos 2000),
lower dependence on trade debt (Petersen and Rajan 1994, 1995), greater protection against the
interest rate cycle (Berlin and Mester 1998,  Ferri and Messori 2000) and increased credit availability
(Cole 1998, Elsas and Krahnen 1998, Scott and Dunkelberg 1999, Machauer and Weber 2000).5
II.b. Main Hypotheses
The capacity  to deliver relationship lending may differ considerably across banks. Our main
hypotheses  are that large banks, foreign-owned  banks, and distressed banks face barriers  in providing
this type of lending.
Large-Bank Barriers Hypothesis
Under the Large-Bank Barriers Hypothesis, large banks tend to have difficulty extending
relationship loans to  informationally opaque  small  businesses.  This  may  occur  because of
Williamson-type  organizational diseconomies of providing relationship lending services along with
providing transactions lending services and other wholesale capital market services to the large
corporate  customers  generally served by large banking organizations. That is, it may be too costly to
provide relationship services to small businesses together with other services to large businesses.
Large banks may also be disadvantaged in relationship lending because this type of lending often
requires "soft" information  that may be difficult to transmit through the communication channels of
large organizations (Stein 2001).  Efforts to coordinate lending in large institutions could lead to
standardized  credit policies based on easily observable, verifiable, and transmittable data, which may
be antithetical to relationship lending (e.g., Berger and Udell 1998, Scott and Dunkelberg 1999,
Haynes, Ou, and Bemey 1999, Cole, Goldberg and White  1999, Machauer and Weber 2000).
However, these  organizational costs may be offset to the extent that diversification  reduces Diamond
5 Not all of this research  found  that credit  tenns improve  with  the strength  of the relationship.  For example,
some found either  unclear or negative associations  between  the length of the relationship  and loan rates
(Petersen  and  Rajan  1994,  Blackwell  and  Winters  1997,  Angelini,  Salvo,  and  Ferri 1998).
4(1984) type delegation  costs in large banks (e.g., Strahan  and Weston 1998,  Black and Strahan  2000).
Large banks may also be disadvantaged in relationship lending because they are more often
headquartered at a substantial distance  from potential  small business borrowers. Relationship  lending
may require local knowledge that gives locally-owned  banks a comparative advantage in this type of
lending. Some research found that relationship lending diminishes with "informational distance," or
the costs of generating borrower-specific information,  which is likely to be associated with physical
distance (Hauswald and Marquez 2000).
Most of the relevant empirical  studies tend to support the Large-Bank Barriers Hypothesis.
Some studies found that large  banks tend to devote a lower proportion of their assets  to small business
lending than smaller institutions (e.g., Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise 1995). Some studies also found
that to the extent that large banks extend small business loans, these banks tend to skew their loans
away from relationship-dependent  small borrowers. Research found that large banks are associated
with low interest rates and low collateral requirements for the small businesses that receive loans
(Berger and Udell 1996).  Similarly,  relative to small banks, large banks more often lend to larger,
older, more financially secure businesses - firms that are most likely to receive transactions loans
(Haynes, Ou, and Bemey 1999). Another study also found that large banks tend to base their small
business loan approval  decisions more on financial ratios, whereas  the existence  of a prior relationship
with the borrowing firm mattered more  to decisions  by small  banks (Cole, Goldberg,  and White 1999).
These studies suggest that large banks tend to issue small business  loans to relatively  safe  transactions
credits, rather than to relatively risky relationship  borrowers that tend to have higher interest rates  and
collateral requirements.6
A number of studies  also examined  the effects of bank M&As on small business  lending  (e.g.,
Keeton 1996, Peek and Rosengren 1998, Strahan and Weston 1998, Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and
Udell 1998, Avery  and Samolyk 2000, Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi  2000). M&As involve  dynamic
6 These conclusions  are based  upon the assumption  that  relationship  loans  by banks  to small  businesses  are
riskier on average than transactions  loans to small businesses. However,  there are also categories  of
transactions  loans  which  may  be quite  risky,  such  as asset-based  loans  extended  by finance  companies  (Carey,
Post,  and Sharpe  1998)  and below-investment-grade  private  placements  extended  by life  insurance  companies
(Carey,  Prowse,  Rea,  and Udell 1993).
5effects, such as changes in bank focus or disruptions caused by the consolidation process, as well as
changes in bank size. These studies usually found that M&As involving large banking organizations
reduced small business lending substantially.
However, other evidence suggests that bank size and consolidation  do not necessarily have
negative consequences  for small business lending. Some of the M&A studies cited above found that
M&As between small organizations  increased, rather than decreased  small  business lending. Another
study examined the probability that small business loan applications will be denied by consolidating
banks and other banks in their local markets and found no clear positive  or negative effects (Cole and
Walraven 1998). Other researchers  found that the probability that a small firm obtains a line of credit
or pays late on its trade credit does not depend in an important way on the presence of small banks in
the market (Jayaratne and Wolken 1999). Additional research suggested that the interest rate  charged
on a small business line of credit tends to be lower in markets dominated by large banks than in
markets dominated by small banks (Berger, Rosen, and Udell 2001).  Still other  research  found mixed
effects of how small businesses were treated by consolidating banks in  terms of satisfying  borrowing
needs, loan approval/rejection,  shopping for lenders, loan rates, etc. (Scott and Dunkelberg 1999).7
Importantly, even if the Large-Bank Barriers Hypothesis is true, the consolidation of the
banking industry may not substantially reduce the total supply of credit to informationally opaque
small businesses because there may be "extemal effects" or general equilibrium  effects in which other
banks react to any reduced supply of credit by the consolidating institutions  by increasing their own
supplies. That is, although relationship-based  small business loans may be dropped by some large
banks after M&As, other banks or nonbank lenders may pick up some of these loans if they are
positive  net present value investments. Several recent studies  found  external effects  of bank M&As in
7 Some  research  has  also  examined  the effects  of distance  on small  business  lending.  Studies  that  evaluated  the
effects  of out-of-state  bank ownership  found small  or conflicting  effects  (e.g., Keeton  1995,  Whalen  1995,
Berger  and  Udell 1996,  Berger,  Saunders,  Scalise,  and Udell 1998). One  study  found  that  distance  barriers  in
small  business  lending  may  be decreasing  because  of improvements  in information  technology  (Petersen  and
Rajan  2000). Finally,  one study  found  that  it is difficult  for  bank  holding  companies  to  control  the efficiency  of
small  banks  located  at a significant  distance  from their holding  company  headquarters,  consistent  with  the
possibility  that small  bank activities,  possibly  including  relationship  lending,  may  be difficult  to operate  from
afar (Berger  and  DeYoung  2001).
6terms of increased lending to small  businesses by other incumbent  banks in  the same local markets  that
offset at least part of the negative quantity effects of M&A participants  (Berger,  Saunders, Scalise,  and
Udell 1998,  Avery and Samolyk 2000, Berger, Goldberg, and White, forthcoming). There may also
be an external effect in the form of an increase in de novo entry - new banks that form in markets
where M&As occur - although the evidence is mixed on this issue (Seelig and Critchfield 1999,
Berger, Bonime, Goldberg, White 2000).
Foreign-Owned-Bank Barners Hypothesis
Under the Foreign-Owneed-Bank  Barriers Hypothesis, foreign-owned  banks are less  likely  to
lend to informationally opaque small businesses than domestically-owned banks.  Foreign-owned
banks are often large and nearly always are headquartered a considerable distance from local small
businesses, and so may suffer size- and distance-related disadvantages in delivering relationship
lending services similar to those of large domestically-owned  banks.  In addition, a foreign-owned
bank may be headquartered in a very different  market environment, with a different  language,  culture,
supervisory/regulatory  structure, and so forth. These market differences may make it costly to gather
and process locally-based  relationship information  and compound the problems associated with size
and distance.  In our empirical analysis, we distinguish between foreign-owned banks in Argentina
that are headquartered in other South American nations versus in other  nations,  since institutions  from
the same continent are generally shorter distances from potential borrowers  and are from markets  with
more similar culture and language.
Despite policy concerns about the potential  effects  of cross-border  consolidation  on the supply
of credit to informationally  opaque small businesses, we are unaware of any prior studies that directly
measured the effects of foreign bank ownership on lending to small businesses. However, there is
some evidence on the  more general issue of the  strategic focus  of foreign-owned institutions.
Specifically, studies have found that foreign-owned  banking organizations tend to have a wholesale
orientation (e.g., DeYoung and Nolle 1996), to buy domestic banks that already have perfonnance
problems and so may reduce credit for other  reasons (e.g., Peek, Rosengren,  and Kasirye 1999),  and to
lend to large corporate affiliates of their customers in their home nation (e.g., Grosse and Goldberg
1991). Finally, one study found that foreign-owned  banks tend to have higher proportions of their
7assets invested in business loans to both domestic and foreign borrowers than domestically-owned
banks, although  the authors did not have information on small business lending specifically  (Stanley,
Craig, and McManis 1993).8
There has also been related research on the association  between foreign ownership  and bank
efficiency. Presumably,  if differences in market environments  create significant barriers  to lending  to
informationally  opaque small businesses, these barriers also reduce bank efficiency. Consistent  with
the Foreign-Owned-Bank Barriers Hypothesis, most studies on this topic found that foreign-owned
banks in a host nation are generally less efficient than the domestically-owned banks in that host
nation (see Berger, DeYoung, Genay, and Udell 2000 for a review). However, one study found that
foreign-owned banks  outperform domestically-owned banks  in  emerging market host nations
(Claessens, Demirgflc-Kunt,  and Huizinga 2001).
As was the case for the Large-Bank Barriers Hypothesis, even if the Foreign-Owned-Bank
Barriers Hypothesis is true, foreign bank entry may not substantially  reduce the total supply of credit
to opaque small firms because of potential  external effects. An increased supply  of relationship  credit
by incumbent domestic banks or de novo entry of domestic banks could offset at least part of any
negative supply effects of foreign-owned banks.
Distressed-Bank  Barriers Hypothesis
Under the Distressed-Bank Barriers Hypothesis, banks that are in financial distress are less
likely to lend to informationally opaque small businesses (more so than to businesses as a whole).
Government  supervisors/regulators,  depositors and other capital market investors,  and/or risk-averse
managers may encourage or require distressed institutions to reduce their risk profile in general, and
their risk from lending  in particular.9  These institutions may reduce relationship lending to
informationally  opaque small businesses more than other types of loans because  the risk of these loans
cannot be easily verified and quantified for govermnent agents, depositors and other capital market
8 The effects  of distance,  language,  and culture  have been observed  in other  financial  phenomena.  Recent
evidence  suggests  that these factors  may explain  the "home  bias" effect, in which  investors  are averse to
including  foreign  stocks  in their  portfolios  (Grinblatt  and Keloharju  2001).
9 For example,  one study of the banking  sectors  of Argentina,  Chile, and Mexico  found that depositors
disciplined  risky  banks  by withdrawing  their deposits  (Martinez  Peria  and Schmukler  2001).
8investors, or senior managers.  In addition, informationally opaque small businesses may avoid
establishing relationships with banks in distress - or banks that are likely to become distressed -
because the consequences  of the withdrawal of credit is so severe for these firms. A small business
that is cut off may incur significant search costs or disruption in finding another lender, and may face
less  favorable loan terms (e.g.,  higher rates,  greater collateral  requirements) until  their new
relationships mature.  In some cases, informnation  problems may prevent them from obtaining new
funding.
Contrary  to the hypothesis, however, bank distress may affect transactions lending more  than
relationship lending. Banks may hold onto "captured" relationship  borrowers during distress periods
to reap future benefits from these relationships (Dell'Ariccia and Marquez 2001).  Relationship
borrowers may also have more difficulty switching their loans to healthy banks than transactions
borrowers when their banks become distressed, so the proportion of loans by distressed banks to
opaque small businesses may rise.
The research  on the effects of bank distress generally  focuses  on total business lending,  rather
than on small business lending. Studies of bank lending behavior generally found that banks  that are
capital impaired or otherwise distressed tend to reduce business lending. Surveys of banking crises
around the world suggested that these crises were often followed by substantial real negative loan
growth during and after the crises, but this was often mitigated  by government bailouts  of the banking
systems (Caprio and Klingebiel 1996, Demirgflc-Kunt,  Detragiache, and Gupta 2000). 10,1  1
One of the most studied cases of the effects of bank distress on lending is the U.S. "credit
10  In an interesting  twist  involving  two  of our  hypotheses  and  using  Argentinean  data,  one  study  found  that  the
presence  of foreign-owned  banks  may mitigate  the effects of national  banking  crises,  with foreign-owned
institutions  having  higher  loan  growth  than domestically-owned  banks  during  crisis  periods  (Goldberg,  Dages,
and  Kinney  2000). However,  again,  small  and large  business  lending  are included  together,  making  it difficult
to evaluate  our  hypotheses  about small  business  lending.
I I There  is also  some  evidence  on the capital-market  effects  of bank distress  and  failure  on publicly  traded
firms.  The  announced  insolvency  of Continental  Illinois  Bank  greatly  reduced  the market  values  of its  publicly-
traded  borrowers,  and  the announcement  of the FDIC  rescue  had  a positive  effect  on these  firmns'  share  prices
(Slovin,  Sushka,  and  Polonochek  1993).  Related  literature  found  that  bank distress  can have  negative  capital
market  effects  on borrowing  fims, although  the studies  varied  in  the measured  severity  and  permanence  of these
effects  (Chiou  1999,  Claessens,  Djankov,  and  Ferni  1999,  Djankov,  Jindra,  and  Klapper  2000,  Kang  and Stulz
2000,  Ongena,  Smith,  and Michalsen  2000).
9crunch" in the early 1990s, in which bank business lending was reduced substantially. Researchers
tested whether the decline in lending was the result of tougher supervisory standards in examining
bank portfolios (e.g., Peek and Rosengren 1995a, Berger, Kyle, and Scalise, forthcoming), the
implementation of Basle-Accord  risk-based capital standards (e.g., Berger and Udell 1994, Wagster
1999), higher explicit or implicit regulatory  capital standards  based  on leverage  ratios (e.g., Berger and
Udell 1994, Peek and Rosengren 1994,1995b, Hancock, Laing, and Wilcox 1995,  Shrieves  and Dahl
1995), the depletion of bank capital from loan loss experiences (e.g., Peek and Rosengren 1995b,
Hancock and Wilcox 1998), or managerial  decisions to reduce risk (e.g., Berger and Udell 1994,  Peek
and Rosengren 1995b, Hancock and Wilcox 1998, Wagster 1999). Although the results fall short of
consensus, they generally found that all of these factors  except  for implementation  of the Basle Accord
led to reduced business lending. These studies generally  used the total business lending of each bank,
rather than separating out small business lending, which is problematic using early 1990s data.
However, one of these studies was able to at least implicitly  analyze  small business  lending. It
found that a $1 capital decline at a small bank reduced business lending more  than a $1 capital decline
at a large bank, implying a greater reduction in small business lending, since small banks tend to
specialize in small business lending (Hancock and Wilcox 1998). The reduction in capital at small
banks was also associated with a decline in the health of small businesses in the same state, consistent
with the Distressed-Bank Barriers Hypothesis.
As with the prior hypotheses,  even if the Distressed-Bank  Barriers  Hypothesis  is true, distress
by a number of banks may not substantially  reduce the total supply of relationship credit to opaque
firms if other healthy banks (domestically-  or foreign-owned) step in with positive external effects.
II.c. Secondary Hypotheses
Our secondary hypotheses  concern the conditions likely to result in a firm borrowing from a
single bank versus from multiple banks. The main conditions tested are the informational  opacity of
the firm and whether the firm's primary bank is in financial  distress.  We identify  the primary  bank as
the bank from which the firn  borrows the most.
Single-Bank  Firm-Opacity Hypothesis
The benefits from a bank-borrower relationship stem mainly from having a single bank with
10proprietary information about the borrower, which may make more credit available at lower cost to
creditworthy,  but infornationally opaque, borrowers. However,  fims that would  benefit  from a single
banking relationship may still borrow from multiple banks in order to avoid a "hold-up" problem in
which a single bank may exploit its market power and extract excessive  rents (Rajan 1992). As well,  a
bank may wish to avoid being locked in as a firm's only lender because of a potential "soft-budget-
constraint" problem in which the firm may be able to coerce the bank to provide additional funds to
avoid losses on previously issued  credit (e.g., Boot 2000).12 Thus, market  power on either side of an
exclusive lending relationship may cause problems that result in firms borrowing from multiple
banks. 13  However, borrowing from multiple banks may  be costly (higher transactions costs,
duplicated effort, free-rider problems, etc.) and informationally inefficient relative to relationship
lending by a single bank.
Under the Single-Bank Firm-Opacity Hypothesis, informationally opaque firms are more
likely to have a  single lender, other things held equal, because the benefits associated with an
exclusive  lending relationship are more likely to outweigh  the costs of information  acquisition  plus the
costs associated with the potential hold-up and soft-budget-constraint  problems for these firms.  In
contrast, transparent firms are more likely to have multiple lenders under this hypothesis to reduce
potential market power problems.
Several studies found that smaller firms tend to have single banking relationships and larger
firms tend to have multiple banks (e.g., Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso 2000, Machauer and Weber
2000, Ongena and Smith 2000). Another study found that smaller firms are less likely  to switch from
single to multiple  banking providers, and that the probability of switching  increases  with age (Farinha
and Santos 2000). These results are consistent with the Single-BankFirm-Opacity Hypothesis, since
12  Borrowers  may  also be reluctant  to borrow  from multiple  banks  for  reasons  of confidentiality.  They  may
fear  that  private  information  revealed  to their  bankers  could  be leaked  to competitors,  and may  minimize  this
risk  by consolidating  their borrowing  in a single  bank (Bhattacharya  and Chiesa  1995).
13  Ironically,  market  power  by a single  bank may  play a positive  role for the small  business  by allowing  the
bank  to subsidize  the borrower  in  the short  term,  and  then  charge  higher-than-competitive  rates  in later  periods
(Sharpe  1990,  Petersen  and Rajan 1995). Some  studies  found  that  less  competition  in banking  is helpful  to
small  fims and start-ups  (Petersen  and Rajan 1995,  Bonaccorsi  di Patti and Dell'Ariccia  2001), but other
research  suggested  more  bank  competition  is helpful  (Black  and  Strahan  2000).  These  market  power  benefits,  if
they  occur,  are lost or diminished  in  the event  that firms  borrow  from  multiple  banks.
11firm size is an inverse indicator of opacity.  14 Of course, firm size is associated with many other firm
characteristics  as well.
Multiple-Bank  Bank-Distress  Hypothesis
Under the Multiple-Bank Bank-Distress Hypothesis, informationally  opaque firms are more
likely to have multiple lenders if their primary bank is in financial  distress. Under this hypothesis, an
opaque firm  borrows from multiple banks to protect itself  against the  possibility of  a future
deterioration  of credit terms or availability  because its primary bank is distressed or fails. A primary
bank that is in distress may take a number of actions that are costly to the firm, ranging from higher
rates and collateral requirements to a complete cut-off of credit and destruction  ofthe relationship.  As
discussed above, a withdrawal of credit may have severe consequences  for opaque firms in terms of
search costs, disruption, unfavorable credit termns,  or being unable to obtain replacement funding.
Other potential replacement lenders may not be able to distinguish whether the withdrawal of credit
was due to the distress of the withdrawing bank versus the creditworthiness of the firm.  We
acknowledge that the Multiple-Bank Bank-Distress Hypothesis follows Detragiache, Garella, and
Guiso (2000), but our hypothesis and tests differ in some important respects, as discussed below.
The Multiple-Bank Bank-Distress Hypothesis has two main empirical predictions.  First,
informationally  opaque firms with primary banks in financial  distress are more likely  to have multiple
bank lenders to protect themselves.  If the primary bank were perfectly safe and sound and in no
danger of distress, there would be no need to dilute relationship benefits and bear the extra costs of
borrowing  from multiple banks. Second, under the hypothesis,  informationally  opaque  firms are more
likely  to have multiple lenders for a given level of primary bank distress. This is because after being
cut off by the primary bank, opaque firms are likely to encounter more difficulty in finding additional
lenders and/or have to face less favorable loan terms until their new relationships mature.
This second prediction of the Multiple-Bank  Bank-Distress Hypothesis runs contrary to the
14 Some  of these  studies  also  examined  other  measures  of opacity  such  as R&D  expenditure  and  patents,  but
did  not find  any  significant  association  (Detragiache,  Garella,  and  Guiso  2000,  Farinha  and  Santos  2000).  One
study found  that switching  from single  to multiple  banks  was positively  related  to poor firm performance
(Farinha  and Santos  2000), which  could be construed  as counterevidence  to the Single  Bank-Firm  Opacity
Hypothesis,  since  low  firm  quality  (i.e.,  high  risk)  may  exacerbate  opacity  problems.
12main prediction of the Single-Bank Firm-Opacity  Hypothesis. Under the Single-Bank Firm-Opacity
Hypothesis, more informationally opaque firms are more likely to borrow from a single bank to take
advantage  of  relationship  lending  benefits,  whereas  under  the  Multiple-Bank  Bank-Distress
Hypothesis, more opaque firms are likely to have multiple bank lenders to insure against the loss of
credit or lending terms in the event of having their credit cut off by a distressed or failed bank. Each
hypothesis may be true for a different subset of firms, so the measured effect of firm opacity on
whether the firm borrows from single versus multiple banks will be taken to be the net effect of these
two different hypotheses. However, the measured effects of primary bank distress gives a relatively
clean test of the effects of the Multiple-Bank Bank-Distress Hypothesis, since the Single-Bank Firm-
Opacity Hypothesis has no prediction about the effect of the primary bank's condition.
Our Multiple-Bank Bank-Distress Hypothesis is similar  to, but differs  in some important  ways
from the analysis of Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso (2000). Both studies include measures of firm
informational  opacity in their empirical  applications. However,  we emphasize  the prediction  that more
opaque firms are more likely to have multiple lenders as protection against loss of credit or lending
term deterioration,  while their theoretical model  does not give predictions  about the effects of opacity.
Their model is also much more complex and allows for the possibility  that the effects of bank fragility
(similar to our concept of bank distress) on the number of banks can go either direction and may
depend on other factors, including the degree to which the bank can make recoveries on bad loans. In
fact, they found that bank fragility has opposing signs on the probability of borrowing from multiple
banks and on the expected number of banks, given that multiple banks are used.  In addition, we
specify the distress of the firm's nrimarv  bank (identified as the bank from which  firm has its greatest
value of loans), whereas Detragiache,  Garella, and Guiso (2000) specified  the weighted  average ofthe
conditions of all the relationship banks.  We argue that the benefits of relationship lending are
maximized by borrowing exclusively from the primary bank, so under the Multiple-Bank Bank-
Distress Hypothesis, the main reason for choosing additional lenders is problems with the financial
health of the primary bank.
A policy implication  of the Multiple-BankBank-Distress Hypothesis is that  some of the long-
term benefits of relationship lending may be lost and extra real resource costs associated  with multiple
13lenders may be borne in banking systems in which a high proportion of assets are in institutions that
are in unsafe, unsound condition.  Thus, lax prudential supervision/regulation and lack of market
discipline  to control bank risk taking could encourage many firms to bear the extra costs of obtaining
multiple banks to insure credit availability and terms and lose the benefits of exclusive banking
relationships. This is in addition to the well-known costs of financial system  fragility and the ex post
costs discussed above under the Distressed-Bank Barriers Hypothesis. The additional costs here are
the ex ante costs associated with borrowing from multiple banks before credit is withdrawn.
As discussed above, several studies found that smaller firms are more likely to have single
banking relationships and larger firms are more likely to use multiple  banks. Assuming that size is an
inverse measure of informational opacity, this tends to support the Single-Bank Firm-Opacity
Hypothesis on net over the Multiple-Bank Bank-Distress Hypothesis.  However, as noted, each
hypothesis may hold for different subsets of banks.  We therefore look to the other empirical
prediction of the Multiple-Bank  Bank-Distress Hypothesis - that informationally opaque firms with
primary banks in financial  distress tend to have multiple bank lenders. The extant literature is mixed
on this issue. One study using Italian data found that firms that borrowed from banks that were more
fragile on average tended to choose a single lender over multiple lenders, but conditional on having
chosen multiple lenders, more fragility led to a larger number of banking relationships (Detragiache,
Garella, and Guiso 2000).  Another study using Italian data found that banks whose borrowers on
average borrow from many banks tend to have higher nonperforming loans, depending upon region
(Ferri and Messori 2000), yielding some support for the Multiple-Bank Bank-Distress Hypothesis.
Another study using Portuguese data, however, found that switching from a single bank lender to
multiple bank lenders was not associated with bank distress (Farinha and Santos 2000).
III.  Backlround Information on the Areentinean Bankini System
Argentina's banking system is unusual in a number of respects, including a relatively large
and growing  market share for foreign-owned  banks and a continued  presence  but reduced  role of state-
owned institutions. The current system reflects a number of important  changes since the early 1990s.
Some of these changes resulted from policy shifts and some resulted from a financial crisis.
Argentina entered the 1  990s on the heels of a period of severe hyperinflation. As a result,
14Argentina implemented its Convertibility  Plan, a program that fixed a 1:  I peso-U.  S. dollar exchange
rate and led to the development of a bimonetary  financial system that permits the use of $U.S. for all
financial  transactions. The Plan also set out an ambitious reform agenda, including a new charter  for
the Central Bank to increase its independence,  privatization  of state-owned  enterprises,  and removal  of
trade barriers. These measures are often credited with stabilizing  the economy and providing a period
of strong  growth. Argentina  moved from hyperinflation in 1989  to less  than 1% inflation  in 1998,  and
the average annual growth of GDP between 1991 and 1998 was more than 6%.
In the 1990s, the banking sector grew even more than the rest of the economy, in part
reflecting the resolution of problems of instability and very high inflation of the 1980s. However,
growth in both the banking and real sectors was significantly interrupted by the Mexican banking
crisis or Tequila crisis in 1994-95 that had substantial contagion effects throughout much of Latin
America. The Tequila crisis  jeopardized the solvency  of many private  Argentinean  banks  and resulted
in a significant number of forced mergers and consolidations  (Clarke and Cull 1998). As a result, the
number of private domestically-owned  banks decreased from 182  to 112  and their share of total assets
decreased from 66% to 30% between December 1991 and December 1998 (Raffin 1999).
During this same time interval, the number of foreign-owned  banks increased  from 32 to 43
and the market shares of these banks soared  - their share of total assets increased  from 14%  to 53%,
their share of total loans rose from 12% to 46%, and their share of deposits grew from 17% to 44%
(Raffin 1999). The increased foreign-owned bank presence reflects not only a flight to quality, but
also a trend towards foreign-owned  bank presence in Latin America as a whole. This shift to foreign
ownership is quite pronounced by world standards  - in most countries the banking market  shares  held
by foreign-owned  banks does not exceed 10% (Levine 1996).
The aggregate data also suggests some significant differences in lending behavior between
foreign- and domestically-owned  banks. In 1997, foreign-owned  banks allocated  almost  95% oftheir
total  credit  to  borrowers in  Buenos  Aires,  where  most of  the  nation's  large businesses are
headquartered. In contrast, domestic private and state-owned banks allocated  43% and 77% of their
total credit, respectively, to provinces outside of Buenos Aires.  In addition, foreign-owned  banks
appeared to lend much more  to large-scale  projects in manufacturing and utilities than domestically-
15owned banks. Domestically-owned  banks more often lend to primary  production  sectors, such as food
products, wood, metal, etc., and retail trade (Cull 1998).  Finally, foreign-owned banks tend to be
larger, to  have  better  quality loan  portfolios, higher  net worth,  and  higher profitability than
domestically-owned  banks (Clarke, Cull, D'Amato, and Molinari 1999).
Argentina also has a large presence  of state-owned banks, although this has been declining  as
a matter of policy. Between 1995 and 1996, 15 financial institutions were privatized (Calomiris and
Powell 2000).  As of 1997, 18 state-owned banks held 31% of total bank assets and 35% of total
deposits. These banks concentrate  on government services, extending a minority of their credit for
primary production. Among the domestically-owned  banks, the state-owned institutions are among
the worst performers in terms of standard criteria, with relatively high percentages of nonperforming
loans. The poor performance  of these institutions, combined with their allocation  of resources  to non-
private enterprises, suggests that  state-owned banks do  not  grant credit according to  wealth-
maximizing  criteria. Specifically,  these banks often have a mandate to lend to certain sectors  (such  as
agriculture) or borrower types, regardless of creditworthiness. State-owned  banks in Argentina have
been found to exhibit a number of other differences in behavior from privately-owned banks,
including having more stagnant loan growth and being less responsive to market signals (Goldberg,
Dages, and Kinney 2000). Because of these differences,  we treat state-owned banks quite differently
from privately-owned  banks in our empirical analysis below.
IV. Data Description and MethodoloEv
In this section, we first describe our data set (subsection IV.a). We then discuss  the equations
for testing our main hypotheses (subsection IV.b) and secondary hypotheses  (subsection IV.c).
IV.a. Data and Summary Statistics
Our main data source is the Central Bank of Argentina's Central  de Deudores or central credit
registry, which contains information on individual businesses, their loans, and the identities of their
banks.  We match these data with financial information on the individual banks from other Central
Bank sources. Prior to the Tequila Crisis, the Central Bank had been collecting information  on major
debtors - those with total debt in the financial  system above 200,000 pesos - in the Central  de Riesgo
(Risk Central) for several years.  Following the crisis, all supervised financial institutions were
16required to report on a monthly basis the status of all loans outstanding in excess of 50 pesos. The
amount outstanding reflects the current balance on the loan, as opposed to the initial amount, which
may be considerably  greater. Key information  supplied by lenders includes  the name of the borrower,
their taxpayer identification  number (QUID), the amount of loans outstanding,  the quality  category  of
the loans on a 1-5 scale (measured by number of days past due), and details of any guarantees.
Borrowers with more than 200,000 pesos in debt are required to provide additional information,
including income and  property holdings  (for individuals) and  balance sheet  and employment
information  (for firms).
We use the data from the Central de Deudores as of the end of 1998.  These data are taken
from the monthly bank reports as of December 1998, although we use the November or October
reports in a few cases in which banks did not report in December. The data set includes information
on 61,295 nonfinancial firms with loans from 98 privately-owned  banks and 17 state-owned banks.
We exclude data on 19,472 nonfinancial firms that have a state-owned bank as their primary
bank (although we include any loans from state-owned banks for borrowers that have a privately-
owned institution as their primary bank).  We make this exclusion because the objectives of state-
owned institutions  in Argentina appear to differ significantly  from those of privately-owned  banks, and
our hypotheses are not intended to apply to state-owned institutions. Inclusion of firms with state-
owned banks as their primary banks could confound our hypothesis  tests because  the behavior  ofthese
banks may not accord with the wealth-maximization  precept that underlies our hypotheses.  For
example, if large or distressed state-owned banks have a strong mandate to lend to some types of
informationally  opaque small businesses, this could obscure the measured effects of the Large-Bank
Barriers Hypothesis or Distressed-Bank Barriers Hypothesis, respectively.  Lending by large or
distressed state-owned  banks to opaque firms could offset  the dearth of lending by large or distressed
privately-owned  banks to these firms and make these hypotheses appear  to be false  when they are true.
We also exclude 1,607 firms with total bank loans less  than 2,000 pesos.  Loans smallerthan
this amount may be checking account overdrafts that might best be viewed as a deposit or payments
service, and are not likely to be indicative of whether large, foreign-owned, or distressed banks face
barriers in providing relationship lending services to informationally opaque small businesses. It is
17also possible that some of these very  small loans are actually personal loans to the owners of the firms,
rather than conventional small business loans.
IV.b. Equations for Testing the Main Hypotheses
To test whether large banks, foreign-owned,  and distressed banks face barriers  in relationship
lending to informationally  opaque small businesses, we run logit equations of the form:
In[P(Barrier)/(1-  P(Barrier))]  =  a + Pi LNSIZE +  2 DELINQ +,3 LNSIZE*DELINQ
+ 81MULTIPLE +
y, Agriculture + Y2  Fishing + y3 Mining +
y4 Utilities + y5  Construction + Y6  Commercial + Si  (1)
All of the variables in equation (1) are described in Table 1, except for the random error term
se. The dependent variables  are based on BNKASSET1  0%, FOREIGN, FOREIGN-SA,  FOREIGN-
NSA, BNKNPL1  0%, BNKLEVI0%, BNKROE1  0%, dummies that take on the value I if the firm  has
at least one loan from a bank that faces a potential barrier - one that is large, foreign-owned,  or in
distress. To ensure robustness, we include a number of different measures of the foreign-owned  and
distressed-bank  barriers. We also run a number of other specifications, including  models in which  the
presence of other barriers are included as control variables.  These control for the  statistical
associations between the dependent variables, which are likely to be strong in some cases (e.g.,
foreign-owned  banks are likely  to be large). We acknowledge  that these  variables  are endogenous  and
their parameters cannot be identified, but we include them only to test robustness.
The  most  important  variables  on  the  right-hand-side of  equation  (1)  are  the  Firm
Opacity/Relationship Strength variables, LNSIZE, DELINQ, and MULTIPLE.  Under the main
hypotheses, the  firms that  are most  informationally opaque  and  have  the  strongest banking
relationships are the least likely to be financed by large, foreign-owned,  or distressed banks. The first
variable is the size of the firm, as indicated by the log of its total bank loans, LNSIZE. Borrower size
is an inverse measure of informational  opacity because smaller firms typically have less informative
financial statements,  less experience, and lower public profiles. Under our main hypotheses,  smaller
firms are less likely  to receive loans from large, foreign-owned,  or distressed  banks. As acknowledged
above, firm size may also represent many other firm characteristics as well.
18The variable DELINQ measures the proportion of the firm's loans that are at least 60 days
past due. This is not by itself a measure of opacity.  However, we argue that delinquency likely
exacerbates opacity problems of small firms and may increase the need for relationship lending
services. That is, a delinquent small borrower may be more likely to need the superior informational
efficiency associated with a single relationship lender to overcome its difficulties. To capture this
effect, we include the interaction term LNSIZE*DELINQ, with the prediction that its coefficient 03
will be negative under the barriers hypotheses.  That is, firm delinquency is likely to exacerbate
opacity problems  more for smaller firms, since opacity problems are worse for smaller firms. We run
the model with and without DELINQ and LNSIZE*DELINQ because we consider these arguments
more speculative  than those about LNSIZE being an inverse measure of opacity.
Our final Opacity/Relationship  variable is MULTIPLE, the indicator  for whether the firm  has
loans from multiple  banks. Borrowing from multiple banks may be viewed as an inverse measure  of
relationship strength and has been used in this capacity in a limited amount of prior research (e.g.,
Ferri and Messori 2000, Machauer and Weber 2000).  Relationships are strongest when they are
exclusive, and so this variable may be a good indicator  that the firm is not receiving relationship  loans
based on private information gathered through exclusive contact over time. 15  Under our main
hypotheses, firms with loans from a single bank are predicted to be less likely to receive loans from
large, foreign-owned,  or distressed banks.
We run the models with and without the variable MULTIPLE because it is likely endogenous
- determined simultaneously with whether  the  firm  receives a  loan  from  a  barriered bank.
Unfortunately,  we do not have any instruments to identify its parameter.  16 Nonetheless,  we believe  it
15  Other  measures  of relationship  strength  used in  empirical  research  include  1)  the existence  of a relationship
(e.g., Cole 1998),  2) the temporal  length  of the relationship  (e.g.,  Petersen  and Rajan  1994,  1995,  Berger  and
Udell 1995,  Angelini,  Di Salvo  and Ferri 1998,  Scott  and Dunkelberg  1999),  3) the breadth  of a relationship
(e.g.,  Cole 1998,  Scott  and Dunkelberg  1999,  Degryse  and Van  Cayseele  2000),  4) the degree  of mutual  trust
between  the bank  and  the firm  (e.g.,  Harhoff  and  Korting  1  998a),  5)  the number  of different  account  managers
(e.g., Scott  and  Dunkelberg  1999),  and  6) the presence  of a hausbank  or  main  bank  (Elsas  and Krahnen  1998).
16 Our  tests  of the secondary  hypotheses  shown  below  do include  potential  instruments  - variables  that  are in
equation  (2)  with  MULTIPLE  as the dependent  variable  that  are excluded  from  equation  (1). However,  these
are measures  of  whether  the primary  lender  is large,  foreign-owned,  and  distressed,  which  are not  exogenous  to
whether  the firm  has one or more  loans  from  a bank with  one  of these  characteristics.
19is of use to show the results both including and excluding this variable to see its (imperfectly)
measured effect and whether the other results are robust to including  this variable.
Thus, under the Bank Barriers Hypotheses, there are three predictions from each equation.
First, there should be a positive effect of LNSIZE, as smaller firms are more opaque and less likely  to
borrow from barriered banks. When DEL1NQ  and LNSIZE*DELINQ are excluded from the model,
the derivative of the dependent variable in (1) with  respect to LNSIZE is ,B  . When the extra  terms are
included, this derivative becomes Ptl  + ,B3  DELINQ. Second, there should be a negative effect of the
interaction term LNSIZE*DELINQ  (03  < 0) under the barriers hypotheses, as firm delinquency is
likely  to exacerbate  opacity problems more for smaller firms. Third, the hypotheses  predict a positive
effect of MULTIPLE when it is included - firms with single banking relationships are likely to be
more opaque and relationship-dependent,  and therefore less likely to borrow from barriered banks.
We also include variables for industry category for purposes of statistical control.  We offer no
predictions regarding these variables because we have no strong reason to expect that any of these
general categories may be more or less opaque than the others.
Our main hypotheses are intended to apply principally to informationally opaque small
businesses, rather than large firms, and we ignore a number of reasons why large  firms may or may  not
receive loans from large, foreign-owned,  or distressed banks. For example, large firms often tend to
borrow from large banks mostly because small banks may face funding constraints, diversification
problems, and supervisory/regulatory resistance to exposing too much of their capital to a single
borrower, including legal lending limits in Argentina. As well, small banks may  not be able to deliver
other capital market products needed by large firms, such as complex financial derivatives.  Some
large firms may choose to borrow from foreign-owned  banks because these firms or their corporate
affiliates have already established ties to these banking organizations in other countries.
We run our models separately for the smallest 25% of firms, smallest 50% of firms,  as well  as
for all firms. This allows us to avoid confounding our main hypotheses about the barriers faced by
large, foreign-owned,  or distressed banks in making loans to small, informationally  opaque firms with
the  reasons why small,  domestic, healthy banks tend  not to  make  loans to very  large firms.
Presumably,  almost all healthy banks can easily  make loans to customers with debt as high as 10,000
20pesos or 33,600 pesos, the cutoffs for our smallest 25% and 50% of firms, respectively. Running the
model by size group also allows us to see how the marginal effects of informational  opacity vary for
different sizes of firms, and for which firm sizes the main hypotheses are consistent with the data.
IV.c. Equations  for Testing the Secondary Hypotheses
To test our secondary  hypotheses about the conditions that result in a firm borrowing from a
single bank versus borrowing from multiple banks, we run logit equations of the form:
ln[P(MULTIPLE)/(1-P(MULTIPLE))] =  a + PI  LNSIZE + ,2  DELINQ + 1B3  LNSIZE*DELINQ  +
0  BNKNPL1O%PRI  +  02 BNKLEV1O%PRI  +
03 BNKROE I  0%PRl +
81  BNKASSETI  0%PRI + °2 BNKFOREIGNPRI +
y, Agriculture + Y2  Fishing + Y3  Mining +
y4 Utilities +  y5  Construction + y6 Commercial  +  62 (2)
The variables in equation (2) are described in Table 2, except for the random error term E2.
The dependent  variable is based on a dummy  that the firm has loans outstanding from multiple  banks.
We run the models for the smallest 25% of firms, smallest 50%, and all firms to avoid confounding
our hypotheses with alternative explanations of the data for large firms.  1  7  This also allows us to
measure how borrower opacity and primary bank distress vary for different sizes of firms and to see
for which firm sizes the secondary  hypotheses are most consistent with the data. To ensure that the
test results are robust, we run the models with several different exclusion  restrictions  discussed  below.
The key exogenous variables  are the Firm Opacity  variables  and the measures  of primary  bank
distress.  The Firm Opacity variables include LNSIZE, DELINQ, and the interaction term.  We
measure  whether  the  firm's  primary  bank  is  in  distress  with  three  dummy  variables  -
BNKNPL1O%PRI,  BNKLEVIO%PRI, and BNKROE10%PRI - that measure whether it is in the
worst 10% of banks in terms of its nonperforming  loans, leverage,  and earnings. As shown  in Table 2,
17  Very  large  firms  tend  to borrow  from  multiple  banks  because  even  a large  single  bank  may  be constrained  in
risking  too much  of their  capital  in loans  to a single  very large  borrower. Some  nationwide  or multinational
large  firms  may  also  borrow  from  multiple  banks  to facilitate  their  operations  in different  regions  or nations.
Other factors about the nation's financial  markets  may also affect the single-bank-versus-multiple-bank
outcome,  including  the enforceability  of creditor  rights,  fragmentation  of the banking  system,  and  the existence
of an active  bond  market  (Detragiache,  Garella,  and  Guiso 2000,  Ongena  and Smith  2000).
21we  also  have  controls  for  whether  the  firm's  primary  bank  is  large  or  foreign-owned -
BNKASSETI  0%PRI and FOREIGNPR-I  - as well as the controls for the firmn's  industry.
The important predictions from equation (2) are as follows.  If the Multiple-Bank Bank-
Distress Hypothesis is true, we expect positive effects of primary bank distress  (01,  02,03  > 0), as firms
borrow from extra banks to  protect themselves against the potential cutoff of credit  or other
deterioration of credit terms  from distressed primary banks.  The  hypotheses yield  opposing
predictions for the opacity variables, so we look for the net effect of which hypothesis dominates. If
the Single-Bank Firm-Opacity  Hypothesis dominates, we expect a negative effect of opacity (PI > 0,
P3 < 0), because smaller, more opaque firms are likely to derive greater net benefits from a single
banking relationship.  If the Multiple-Bank Bank-Distress Hypothesis dominates, these signs are
reversed because more opaque firms need greater protection against the potential cutoff of credit.
V.  Empirical  Results
Tables 3-9 show our tests of our main hypotheses  - the Large-Bank, Foreign-Owned-Bank,
and Distressed-Bank  Barriers Hypotheses. As discussed earlier, we run our models separately  for the
smallest  25% of firms, smallest 50% of firms, and all firms to avoid confounding  our main hypotheses
about the barriers in lending to small, informationally  opaque firms  with reasons  why other  banks  tend
not to make loans to large firms, and to see how the results vary for different sizes of firms.  The
hypotheses are mainly intended to apply to the smaller size groups.
For each firm size group, we run each model three'times, once with LNSIZE as the only
indicator of Firm Opacity/Relationship  Strength,  once  with DELINQ  and LNSIZE*DELINQ  included
as well, and  once with  MULTIPLE also  included. Under the  Bank Barriers Hypotheses, the
predictions are a positive effect of LNSIZE (smaller firms are less likely to borrow from barriered
banks), a negative effect of the interaction term LNSIZE*DELINQ (firm delinquency is likely to
exacerbate opacity  problems more for smaller firms), and a positive effect of MULTIPLE (firms with
single banking relationships are more opaque and less likely  to borrow from barriered banks).
The tests of the Large-Bank Barriers Hypothesis  are shown  in Table 3. The simplest  model in
which LNSIZE is the sole Opacity/Relationship  indicator is shown in columns (1), (4), and (7) of the
table for the smallest 25% of firms, smallest 50%, and all firms, respectively.  The coefficients of
22LNSIZE in these columns are all positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.  These are
consistent with the prediction of the hypothesis that within each size group, a smaller firm is more
opaque and therefore is less likely to have a loan from a large bank.
We evaluate the economic  significance of firm size by simulating the effect of doubling firm
size and calculating the change in the probability of receiving a loan from a barriered bank, starting
from the subsample means for P(Bank Barrier) and all the other variables. For the smallest 25% of
firms in column (1), the probability of receiving a loan from a large bank increases from 54.55% to
63.73%. This amounts to an economically significant 16.83% increase in the probability  of receiving
a loan from a large bank, which is displayed in a row near the bottom of the table. For the smallest
50% of firms and for all firms in columns (4) and (7), respectively,  the probability of receiving  a loan
from a large bank is predicted to increase by only about 6% as firm size doubles. As discussed  above,
we expect greater effects for differences in opacity among smaller firms under the Large-Bank
Barriers Hypothesis.
We next examine the effects of LNSIZE in the other models shown in Table 3 with additional
Opacity/Relationship  indicators included. In these models, the economic significance depends upon
both the coefficients of LNSIZE and the interaction term LNSIZE*DELINQ. As shown in the table,
the inclusion of DEL1NQ and LNSIZE*DELINQ makes virtually no difference to the economic
significance of LNSIZE. The results in columns (2), (5), and (8) again suggest that as the size of the
firm doubles, the probability of receiving a loan from a large bank is predicted to increase by about
17% for the smallest 25% of firms and by about 6% for the smallest 50% of firms and for all firms.
The inclusion of MULTIPLE has virtually no effect on the economic significance of LNSIZE for the
smallest 25% of firms, as shown in column (3).  However, the inclusion of MULTIPLE eliminates
most of the economic significance of LNSIZE for the smallest 50% of firms and for all firms -
reducing the effect of doubling firm size on the probability of borrowing  from a large bank to less  than
2%.  This may suggest that for larger firms, having loans from multiple banks is an overwhelming
inverse indicator of relationship strength that dominates changes in firm size. The fact  that the effects
of LNSIZE are more robust for the smallest 25% of firms again is consistent with the predictions of
the Large-Bank Barriers Hypothesis, which applies principally to the smallest firms.
23We next examine the coefficients  of the interaction  term LNSIZE*DELINQ  in  the models that
include this term in Table 3.  We find that the coefficients on these interaction terms are all negative
and 5 of the 6 coefficients are statistically  significant at the 1% level and the remaining coefficient is
significant at the 10% level.  These negative coefficients are consistent with the hypothesis - firm
delinquency may exacerbate opacity problems more for smaller firms within each of our size groups.
The coefficients are more than twice as large in absolute value for the smallest  25% of firms than for
the smallest 50% of firms and all-firms models, consistent with the Large-Bank Barriers Hypothesis.
The coefficients of MULTIPLE are positive and statistically  significant at the 1% level  for all
3 size groups.  These are consistent with the prediction of the hypothesis that firms with single
banking relationships are more informationally  opaque  and less likely  to borrow  from large  banks. We
evaluate the economic significance of MULTIPLE by simulating switching from a single bank to
multiple banks and calculating the change in the probability of receiving a loan from a barriered  bank,
starting from the subsample means for all the other variables. As shown near the bottom of Table 3,
the probability of receiving a loan from a large bank is predicted to increase  substantially as the firm
switches from a single bank to multiple banks, more than doubling (increasing by more than 100%)
for the two smallest size groups. The effect is greatest for the smallest 25% of firms, consistent with
the hypothesis. As discussed above, the variable MULTIPLE is likely endogenous, and we do not
have any instruments for it, but we show the results both including and excluding this variable to see
its (imperfectly)  measured effect and to test the robustness of the other results.
We conduct other robustness checks as well. We rerun the tests of the barriers hypotheses
including  the presence  of other barriers as control  variables,  despite  their endogeneity. Although  these
models are not fully identified, the purpose is to control for the statistical associations anong  the
barrier indicator variables and to be sure that one barrier variable is not proxying for another barrier.
In testing the Large-Bank Barriers Hypothesis, a particular concem is that BNKASSETI 0% may in
part be picking up the effects of the Foreign-Owned-Bank Barriers Hypothesis, since most of the
24largest banks are also foreign-owned.  18 As well, at the time of our sample in 1998,  the largest banks
generally had less financial distress than other institutions, raising a concern that BNKASSET1  0%
may in part proxy (inversely) for the effect of the Distressed-Bank Barriers Hypothesis. When we
include the FOREIGN and BNKNPL10% dummies on the right-hand-side, the test results were
materially  unchanged (not shown in tables).
In sum, the results are generally  consistent with the Large-BankBarriers Hypothesis. For the
smallest  25% of firms, the coefficients of LNSIZE, LNSIZE*DELINQ,  and MULTIPLE  are all of the
predicted sign and statistically significant at the  1% level, the measured effects of LNSIZE and
MULTIPLE are economically significant, and these findings are robust to inclusion or exclusion of
some of the Opacity/Relationship  indicators and indicators of the other barriers as control variables.
The statistical  and economic significance were somewhat less when the models included data for the
smallest 50% of firms and all finns, but as noted above, the Large-Bank Barriers Hypothesis applies
principally to the smallest firms, and these are the cleanest tests in terms of avoiding competing
hypotheses about lending to large firms.
The tests of the Foreign-Owned-Bank  Barriers Hypothesis are shown in Tables 4, 5, and 6,
which display  the findings for all foreign-owned  banks, those headquartered in other South  American
nations, and those headquartered in non-South American countries, respectively.  Looking first at
Table 4 for all foreign-owned banks, the measured effects of LNSIZE are generally  consistent  with the
hypothesis - within each size group, a smaller firm appears to be less likely to have a loan from a
foreign-owned  institution. The coefficients of LNSIZE are all positive and statistically significant at
the 1% level in columns (1), (4), and (7), and doubling firm size generally increases the predicted
probability  of borrowing from foreign  banks by about 10% in most cases. Similar  to the tests in Table
3 above, the inclusion of MULTIIPLE  substantially  reduces the measured effects of LNSIZE for the
smallest 50% and all-firms size groups.  Also similar to the earlier tests, the coefficients of the
18  The  variable  BNKASSETIO%  equals  1  if  the firn borrows  from  any  ofthe 10  largest  privately  owned  banks
in  Argentina,  and  8 of these  10  banks  are also  foreign  owned.  However,  the largest  two  banks  in  the country  are
both  domestically  owned.  Banco  de la Nacion  Argentina  and  Banco  de la Provincia  de Buenos  Aires  together
account  for more  than 20% of the lending  in  the nation.
25interaction term LNSIZE*DELINQ are all negative and statistically significant, and the measured
effects of MULTIPLE are positive and both economically  and statistically significant. As well, all of
the measured effects are at least somewhat stronger for the subsample of the smallest 25% of firms
than for the subsample of the smallest 50% of firms and for the full sample of all firms.
Thus, the results in Table 4 are qualitatively similar to those in Table 3 and are generally
consistent with the Foreign-Owned-Bank Barriers Hypothesis.  However, not all of the results are
robust to the inclusion of the presence  of other barriers as control variables. Specifically,  the effects  of
LNSIZE  become  economically  and  statistically  insignificant  and  the  interaction  term,
LNSIZE*DELINQ, becomes  statistically insignificant  for  the  smallest  25%  of  firms  when
BNKASSETI0% and BNKNPLI0% are included as control variables. However, the results for the
smallest 50% and all-firms models remained robust to the inclusion of these variables. One reason
why the measured effect of LNSIZE  on the probability of borrowing from a foreign-owned  bank may
disappear when large bank size is controlled  for is that foreign banks that are not large simply  make  so
few loans to the smallest 25% of firms - only 7.6% of these firms have loans from foreign-owned
banks that are not in the top 10% in terms of bank assets. That is, after taking account of the strong
effect of large bank size, there may simply be too little variation in the FOREIGN variable for small
firms. In sum, most of the results are consistent with the Foreign-Owned-Bank Barriers Hypothesis,
but it is much less certain that the hypothesis predicts the marginal effects of firm size within the
smallest 25% of firms size group.
The results shown in Table 5 for the foreign-owned banks headquartered in other South
American nations are generally less statistically and economically significant than for all the foreign
banks shown in Table 4.  The results suggest a generally weaker correspondence with the Foreign-
Owned-Bank Barriers Hypothesis for foreign-owned  banks  headquartered  on the same  continent,  with
the effect  of LNSIZE being  statistically insignificant for  the smallest 25% of firms, and  the
coefficients  of LNSIZE*DELINQ  being positive for the smallest 25% and smallest 50% of firms. In
contrast, the results shown in Table 6 for the foreign banks headquartered in non-South American
26countries are quite similar to those for all foreign-owned banks. 19  The findings in these tables
generally suggest that any barriers to foreign-owned banks making relationship-based loans to
informationally opaque small businesses are likely to be greater for banks based outside of South
America,  perhaps  due  to  longer  distances,  or  greater  differences  in  language,  culture,
supervisory/regulatory  structures,  and so forth.
The tests of the Distressed-Bank  Barriers Hypothesis are shown in Tables 7, 8, and 9, which
give the findings for banks with nonperforming loan problems, leverage problems, and earnings
problems, respectively. The data generally do not support the Distressed-Bank  Barriers Hypothesis.
The coefficients on LNSIZE and the interaction term LNSIZE*DELINQ  are often insignificant or of
inconsistent  signs  - in many cases distressed banks appear to favor  smaller,  more delinquent firms. As
discussed above, the effects of bank distress may in some cases be concentrated more on large firms
that receive transactions loans because banks may wish to protect future rents by keeping their
relationship borrowers or because large firms may more easily switch to healthy banks when their
banks become distressed.  Generally, we cannot conclude whether the effect of bank distress on
lending to small opaque borrowers is greater than or less than the effect on  lending to  large,
transparent borrowers.
Table 10 shows the tests of our secondary hypotheses - the Single-Bank Firm-Opacity and
Multiple-Bank Bank-Distress Hypotheses.  The equations are estimated using logit discrete choice
models, and the dependent variable in each case is a  dummy for whether the  firn  has loans
outstanding from multiple banks. We run the models for the smallest  25% of firms,  smallest 50%, and
all firms for the reasons discussed above.
For each size group, we show three regressions, one with just  LNSIZE and the control
variables, one that adds in the DELINQ and LNSIZE*DEL1NQ  terms, and one that also includes  the
primary bank distress  variables. As indicated earlier, if the Single-Bank Firm-Opacity Hypothesis is
19 As occurred  for the main sample,  the effects of LNSIZE  and LNSIZE*DELINQ  become statistically
insignificant  for  the smallest  25%  of firms  when  BNKASSET1O%  and  BNKNPL1O%  are included  as control
variables.  The similarity  of results  in Tables  4 and  6 is not surprising,  since  the banks  headquartered  in  non-
South  American  countries  are  generally  quite  large  and  account  for  most  ofthe lending  by foreign-owned  banks.
27dominant, we expect a positive effect of LNSIZE (smaller firms have geater net benefits  from a single
banking relationship), a negative effect of the interaction  term LNSIZE*DELINQ  (firm  delinquency  is
likely to exacerbate opacity problems more for smaller firms), while these signs are reversed if the
Multiple-Bank Bank-Distress Hypothesis is dominant (more opaque firms need more protection
against the potential cutoff of credit). Under the Multiple-Bank Bank-Distress Hypothesis, we also
expect positive effects of the indicators of primary bank distress (firms with distressed primary  banks
seek protection  against the potential cutoff of credit).
The clearest results in Table 10 are shown in the full specifications  of the model in columns
(3), (6), and (9).  In these columns, the coefficients of the indicators of primary bank distress -
BNKNPLIO%PRI,  BNKLEVIO%PRI, and BNKROE1O%PRI  - are all positive and are almost all
statistically significant, consistent with firms seeking protection from the potential cutoff of credit
under the Multiple-Bank  Bank-Distress Hypothesis. The results are generally  stronger  for the smallest
25% and smallest 50% of firms, which may reflect that these banks might have the greatest cost from
having their credit cut off by a distressed or failed primary bank.
The coefficients of LNSIZE are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in all
cases, and the predicted effects of doubling firm size are also positive and economically significant.
This finding is consistent with a dominance  of the Single-BankFirm-Opacity  Hypothesis,  under which
a smaller firm within each size group is more likely to need the relationship lending services of a
single bank. However,  the findings for the interaction  term LNSIZE*DELINQ  are not as clear. These
coefficients are positive and statistically significant for the smallest 25% of firms, but negative and
much smaller in magnitude for the smallest 50% and all-firms groups. One possible interpretation  is
for the smallest 25% of firms, the positive, significant coefficients reflect a domination of the
Multiple-Bank Bank-Distress Hypothesis for the effects of delinquency for this group.  That is, the
small firms that have their own repayment problems are the most worried about being cut off from a
distressed bank and therefore seek multiple lenders if they can obtain them. However, the change in
sign for larger  firms and the dominance  of the Single-Bank Firm-Opacity Hypothesis in the measured
effects of LNSIZE make it difficult to draw strong conclusions from the interaction terms.
VI.  Conclusion
28The consolidation of the banking industry is shifting assets into larger institutions that often
operate in many nations.  Given the orientation of most large, international organizations toward
serving large, wholesale customers, consolidation raises the issue of the ability  of the banking system
to supply credit to informationally  opaque small businesses in the future. Bank financial  distress  may
also create problems of credit availability for these firms, as evidenced by the financial crises and
credit crunches around the globe in recent years.
To shed light on these issues, we test several hypotheses about the supply of relationship
credit to informationally opaque small businesses.  Under the Large-Bank Barriers Hypothesis,
Foreign-Owned-Bank  Barriers  Hypothesis,  and Distressed-Bank  Barriers  Hypothesis,  large bank size,
foreign ownership, and  bank  distress, respectively, represent significant barriers to  providing
relationship lending services.  We use a rich, new data set to test these hypotheses that matches
information  on individual small businesses, their bank loans, and their banks.
The data are generally  consistent with the Large-Bank  Barriers Hypothesis and the Foreign-
Owned-Bank Barriers Hypothesis, although  the latter hypothesis may only  be effective if the foreign
bank is headquartered in a far-away  nation. Informationally opaque small businesses tend to receive
less credit from large banks and foreign banks, and this effect is magnified for small businesses with
delinquencies in repaying their loans.  The data do  not support the Distressed-Bank Barriers
Hypothesis  - the effect of bank distress on lending does not appear to be consistently  any stronger for
informationally opaque small businesses than for large transactions borrowers.
We also test some related secondary  hypotheses regarding which firms borrow from a single
bank versus from multiple banks. Under the Single-Bank Firm-Opacity Hypothesis, informationally
opaque small businesses are more likely to have a single lender than other firmns.  This is because for
these businesses,  the benefits associated  with  the acquisition  and possession  of proprietary  information
by a single lender likely outweighs the potential  costs of exploitation of market  power in an exclusive
relationship.  Under the Multiple-Bank Bank-Distress Hypothesis, the single-versus-multiple-bank
decision depends on the financial  condition of the firm's primary bank - firms borrow from multiple
lenders to insure their own credit availability if their primary bank is in financial distress. The data
support the Multiple-Bank  Bank-Distress  Hypothesis  - firms  tend to borrow  from multiple  banks when
29their primary bank is in financial distress.  The data also suggest that smaller firms tend to have
exclusive lending relationships, all else equal, providing some limited support for the Single-Bank
Firm-Opacity  Hypothesis.
There are many policy concerns regarding bank mergers and acquisitions (M&As), foreign
entry, and prudential  supervision and regulation, and this research focuses on one of these concerns  -
the supply of relationship credit to informationally  opaque small businesses. Our results suggest that
some large and foreign-owned institutions that are created by M&As and foreign entry may have
difficulty extending relationship loans to opaque small firms. Any bank distress that may result from
lax prudential supervision and regulation appears to have no greater effect on the supply of credit to
small borrowers  than to large borrowers. However, even some small firms may react to bank distress
by borrowing  from multiple banks, creating additional real resource costs as well as the destruction  of
some of the benefits from relationship lending.  Our results and those in the related literature are
subject to a number of important caveats. The overall supply of relationship credit to opaque small
firms depends on many other factors as well, including i) whether other banks in the market or new
entrants compensate  by changing their supply of relationship  credit, ii) the robustness of the empirical
results, and iii) how well the results apply across nations with different market environments.
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36Table 1: Definitions and Summary Statistics for
Variables Used to Test the Main Hypotheses
Summary  statistics are for the sample of firms used to test the Large-Bank,  Foreign-Owned  Bank and
Distressed-Bank  Barriers Hypotheses. The total number of observations  is 61,295, which excludes  all
firms whose primary bank is state-owned and firms with total bank loans less than 2,000 pesos.
Variable  Name  Definition  I  Mean  StdDev
_  Bank Barrier Variables (Dependent Variables)
BNKASSET10%  =  I if a firm  borrows  from at least one  bank that is in the  65.08%  47.67%
largest 10% of banks ranked by asset size (excluding
state-owned  banks)
FOREIGN  =  I if a firm  borrows  from  at least one  bank  that is foreign  52.89%  49.92%
FOREIGN-SA  =  I if a firm  borrows  from  at least  one  foreign-owned  bank  10.55%  30.71%
headquartered  in a South American  country  other than
Argentina
FOREIGN-NSA  I if a firm  borrows  from  at least  one  foreign-owned  bank  42.35%  49.41%
NOT  headquartered  in  another  South  American  country
BNKNPL10%  =  I if a firm borrows  from at least one bank whose  non-  2.48%  15.55%
performing  loan  (NPL)  ratio,  measured  as total  bank  NPL
to total loans,  is in the top 10% (excluding  state-owned
banks)  _____
BNKLEV10%  I  1  if  a firm  borrows  from  at least  one  bank  whose  leverage,  19.62%  39.71%
measured  as total assets  to total debt, is in the top 10%
(excluding  state-owned  banks)
BNKROE10%  - I if a firm borrows  from at least one bank  whose  ROE,  2.10%  14.35%
measured  as the ratio  of profits  to  equity,  is in the bottom
10%  (excluding  state-owned  banks)
Firm Opacity/Relationship  Variables
SIZE  The sum  of the firm's total loans  from  all banks  (not  662,148  6,376,926
included  in regressions)  pesos  pesos
LNSIZE  Natural log of the sum of the firm's total  loans from all  10.68  1.90
banks  pesos  pesos
DELINQ  =  Proportion  of loans  greater  than  60 days  past-due  15.92  35.46
MULTIPLE  =  I if a firm  has loans  from  more  than one bank  43.95%  49.63%
Firn Industry Variables
Agriculture  I if a finn's primary  activity  is Agriculture  15.78%  36.45%
Fishing  1 if a firm's primary  activity  is Fishing  0.20%  4.49%
Mining  =  I if a firm's primary  activity  is Mining  3.01%  17.07%
Utilities  =  I if a firm's primary  activity  is Utilities  0.92%  9.52%
Construction  I if a firtn's primary  activity  is Construction  9.15%  28.83%
Commercial  I if a frm's primary  activity  is Commercial  35.25%  47.78%
37Table 2: Definitions and Summary Statistics for
Variables  Used to Test the SecondarY Hypotheses
Summary  statistics  are for the sample  of firms used to test the  Single-Bank  Firm Opacity  and
Multiple-Bank  Distress  Hypotheses.  The total number  of observations  is 61,295,  which  excludes
all firms  whose primary  bank  is state-owned  and firms with total bank  loans  less than 2,000  pesos.
Variable Name  Definition  |Mean  Std Dev
Multiple Bank Variable (Dependent Variable)
MULTIPLE  I if a firm has loans from more than one bank  43.95%  49.63%
Firm Opacity Variables
SIZE  The sum of the firm's total loans from all banks.  662,148  6,376,926
____________________________________________________  pesos  pesos
LNSIZE  =  Logged value of the sum of the firm's total loans from all  10.68  1.90
banks  pesos  pesos
DELINQ  =  Proportion of loans greater than 60 days past-due  15.92  35.46
Primary Bank Distress Variables
BNKNPLIO%PRI  =  I if a firm's primary bank's non-performing loan (NPL)  1.38%  11.67%
ratio, measured as total bank NPL to total loans, is in the
top 10%  (excluding state-owned banks)
BNKLEVIO%PRI  =  I  if a firm's primary bank's leverage, measured as total  13.36%  34.02%
assets to total debt, is in the top 10% (excluding state-
owned banks)
BNKROEJG%PRI  =  I if a firm's primary bank's ROE, measured as the ratio of  0.75%  8.60%
profits to liquid assets, is in the Smallest 10% (excluding
______________________  state-owned  banks)  ____  __  ___  _
__________  __  Other Primary Bank Variables
BNKASSETIO%PRI  =  I if a firm's primary bank is in the largest 10% of banks  52.55%  49.94%
ranked by asset size (excluding state-owned banks)
FOREIGNPRI  =  I if a firm's primary bank is foreign  40.66%  49.12%
_______________  Firm Industry  Variables
Agriculture  =  1 if a firm's primary activity is Agriculture  15.78%  36.45%
Fishing  =  I if a firm's primary activity is Fishing  0.20%  4.49%
Mining  =  I if a firm's primary activity is Mining  3.01%  17.07%
Utilities  =  I if a firm's primary activity is Utilities  0.92%  9.52%
Construction  =  I if a firm's primary activity is Construction  9.15%  28.83%
Commercial  =1  if a firn's  primary activity is Commercial  35.25%  47.78%
38Table 3:  Tests of Larze-Bank  Barriers  Hvwothesis
Logit Regression:  Dependent  Variable =  BNKASSETIO%
Smallest 25%  Smallest 50%  All Firms
(￿  10,000 Pesos)  (s 33,600 Pesos)
(1)  '(2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat
Intercept  -4.45  13.97  -5.43  15.38  -5.29  14.74  -i.62  11.22  1.85'  11.60  -0.56  | 3.37  40.18  -2.51  41.47  4  13.72
LNSIZE  0.55-'  - 14.84  0.66  16.10  0.64  15.24  13.55  0  .24  13.56  0  .08  '  4.31  0.26  4'  4  9.31  ...  49.93  lo.1  15.15
DELINQ  5.26  6.21  5.58  6.51  131r'  3.48  0.91  2.37  2T.09  13.41  204  12.70
LNSIZE*DELINQ  -0.60  6.02  -0.63  6.29  0.13  3.17  1.86  - 1397  6.19  1249
MULTIPLE  =  1.35...  21.69  L 44"'  40.07I56.69
Agriculture  _0_79..  14.29  4.77  14.02  4.96  16.74  _0_63..  17.12  -0.62  16.81  -0. 84'  21.62  0.22  9.10  9.23  9.41  4.47...  17.99
Fishing  0.31  0.65  0.28  0.59  0.02  0.04  0.39  1.18  0.38  1.15  0.24  0.71  0.51  2.29  0.51  2.26  0.33  1.43
Mining  2.26  10.31  2.24  10.22  713.66  1.5  10.51  1.84  19.58  1L43.  15.08
Utilities  0.53"  2.22  0.54"  2.23  0.25  0.99  0.55"'  3.19  0.55-  3.22  0.22  1.21  0.56-  4.95  4.76  0  .29"  2.47
Construction  0.40"'  5.16  0.40  5.10  0.24  3.02  0.43  8.28  0.43  8.24  0.20  3.65  0.48...  13.98  0.49"  14.07  0.26  7.26
Commercial  4.20-".  5.44  4.20"  5.39  4.32"'  8.45  409  - 3.68  4.09-  3.59  -0.32"'  11.92  0.10--  543  0.10  5.34  1.3"  11.39
Economic Significance:  16.83%  17.16%  16.43%  6.18%  6.41%  1.97%o  6.11%  603%  1.68%
SIZE x2 (V%A)
Economic Significance:  185.4%  150.3%  80.33%
MULTIPLE 0 to I (-/.A)
Observations:  15,379  15,379  1  15,379  j  30,657  30,657  30.657  LA6,295  61,295  61,295
*, **,  *''  represent  significance  at the  10%,  5%,  and  1%  levels,  respectively.
39Table 4:  Tests of Forei2n-Owned  Bank Barriers Hypothesis
Logit Regression: Dependent  Variable  =  FOREIGN
Smallest 25%  Smallest 50%  All Firms
____________________  _  _______________  (s 10,000 Pesos)  (s 33,600 Pesos)
( 1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat
Intercept  -2  7  .29-  -2.95'  81  7.28  T  7  14.86  -2  15.53  1T  7.08  -3.12  58.47  -3 .4'0  57.96  -2.04  32.65
LNSIZE  0.24'  6.32  2  7.10  259  6 03  21_  13.35  13  95  4.51  59.40  32  58.948  25.87
DELINQ  2__6___  2.79  2.59  ..  3.03  5.143  r-4.01  - _95_____  12.75  1.9-8"'r  172.73-
LNSIZE*DELINQ  -0.24"  2.39  -026.  2.58  -O.  19  ...  4.67  -0.14  3.31  _76  - 0219.82  12.04
MULTIPLE  =  1.25  22.86  1._33_  _  41.01  1.41  65.05
Agriculture  -1.03..  16.12  -1.01"'  15.68  -- T.21'-  18.19  -0.94...  22.68  -0.93  22.29  -1.17."  26.76  _07.._  28.65  -0.71 . 28.70  -0.96-  . 36.94
Fishing  0.65  1.40  0.61  1.30  0.36  0.73  06  4"  2.05  0.63'  2.01  0.52  1.61  1.05'  -4.63,  _____  4..  .60  0.94 ...  4.0
Mining  2.01  12.49  0  61  12.30  1.64-  9.  797  4.  _  _  16.20  2  73  6.05  0.33  12.09  22.29  15  22.13  1.21  16.85
Utilities  0.79-  - 3.46  _______  3.52  0.53*  2.26  0.83'  5.10  084  5.16  3.18  6.96  6.85  0.52'  4.76
Construction  0. 3  5.04  0.37"  4.95  0.21  2.80  10.48  10.43  5.85  1.6  1  8.89  .61  18.93  0.42  12.69
Commercial  -0.25  6.60  -0.24  6.49  -0.37  9.53  -0.08  3.25  -0.08  3.10  0.I31  1  132  0 12"  6.85  012  6.85  -0.18  8.98
Economic Significance:  10.24%  11.13%  9.26%  8.38%  8.69%  2.23%  9.70%  9.69%  4.27%
SIZE x2 (%A)  . _  _  _
Economic Significance:  167.9%  137.4%  73.65%
MULTIPLE 0 to I (%A)  _  _  _  . _
Observations:  15,379  15,379  1  15,379  30,657  30,657  30,657  _  61,295  61,295  61,295
"'"*represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
40Table 5:  Tests of Foreign-Owned Bank Barriers Hypothesis  for Banks Headiuartered in other South American Countries
Logit Regression: Dependent Variable =  FOREIGN-SA
Smallest 25%  Smallest 50%  All Firms
(s  10,000  Pesos)  (< 33,600  Pesos)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat
Intercept  4.26.  5.58  4.23  4.84  -3.69..  4.19  -5.29-"  16.07  4.76  12.38  -3.39..  8.63  -6,46+"  77.79  -6.97.  74.27  -6.52"'  67.20
LNSIZE  0.14  1.59  0.13  1.26  0.05  0.47  0.25..  7.09  01'8  4.26  0.00  0.06  0.36  50.50  0.39  49.77  031T  36.57
DELINQ  -0.87  0.47  -0.70  0.38  -:1.66  2.19  -2.13  2.80  2.1 5  9.3  5  2.61  11.12
LNSIZE*DELINQ  0.15  0.70  0.14  0.64  _  0.25..  3.08  0.31  3.84  -5.14_  _  6.55  -0.17..  7.94
MULTIPLE  1.23..  12.60  1  i .13  19.11  =  0.90  24.88
Agriculture  -0.18  1.34  -0.15  407  248  - 2.05  -0.11  1.18  -0.28  3.08  -0.02  0.55  0.03  0.72  -0.08'  2.07
Fishing  1_48_  2.41  1.42"  2.30  1 15'  I.74  1.00"  2.19  1.03"  2.21  0.87'  1.79  0.98  4.39  0.98  4.38  0.8  3.82
Mining  -0.95  2.09  -00  2.19  ...  3.31  -. 55  2.22  -0.56-  2.29  -1.03-  4.12  0.23  3.23  0.23  3.16  0.07  0.92
Utilities  -0.75  1.03  -0.73  1.00  -1.21  1.63  -0.39  0.97  -0.31  0.76  -0.72  1.76  0.11  0.87  0.13  1.08  0.05  0.38
Construction  2.24  24.02  2.24"  23.94  2.12  22.63  2.29"  38.18  2  37.95  35.26  1.90  56.28  1.90"'  56.09  I 82  53.22
Commercial  -1.17"'  9.21  -1.16-"  9.14  -1.40"  '  10.79  07  9.89  -0.64"'  9.44  -0.94"'  13.30  -0.09."  2.82  0.07"  2.19  4  .27"'  8.47
Economic Significance:  9.66%  10.72%  4.94%  17.65%  15.57%  3.49%  24.62%  25.20%  18.95%
SIZE  x2  (%A)
Economic Significance:  164.3%  113.9%  50.01%
M ULTIPLE  0  0 1o  (0%A)  __  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  __  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _
Observattons:  *15,379  ___  1537  ___  1,79  30,657  3065  ___  30,657  ___  61,295  _____  61,295  ___  61,295
""  represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
41Table 6:  Tests of Foreign-Owned  Bank Barriers Hypothesis for Banks Headquartered  in Non-South American Countries
Logit Regression: Dependent  Variable =  FOREIGN-NSA
Smallest 25%  Smallest  50%  All Firms
(s  10,000  Pesos)  (s_  33 600  Pesos)
(})  '  '(2)  (3)  (4)  '  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat
Intercept  5  7.30  - 8.23  5  -1.99  13.30  -253  154  43  8.24  -1.63  33.40  37  7 3.14  7W.6  11.92
LNSIZE  5.78  0.29  6.76  ~~~~~ ~~~~~  ~~~0.26  5.90  017  1  _0.45  0.23'  2.59  05.'09  4.84  .1358.5329.47  0.01  1.48
DELINQ  2.842.81  3.25  300  3.43  _  _7.40  2.57..  6.60  _  1.17.  7.80  133..  8.66
LNSIZE*DELINQ  -0.30  2.93  -0.32  3.09  -. 31  7.36  -0.27  6.39  -0.13.  9.20  -0.14  9.53
MULTIPLE  0.99 ...  18.52  t.07 ... _33.80_  1.14  54.28
Agriculture  -1.09.  15.85  -1.07  15.52  -1.23  17.33  -0.98  22.12  4.98  22.13  -1.16  25.43  -0.67  _  27.24  _-0.69.  27.82  -0.87"'.  33.92
Fishing  0.08  0.18  0.05  0.09  -0.18  0.38  0.33  1.06  0.31  1.00  0.20  0.63  0.35  1.91  0.35  1.91  0.22  1.20
Mining  1  3.40  2.05  13.22  1.77  11.22  576-  1734  1.75  17.23  1.43  1T37  098  18.86  18.  0.7  . 13.65
Utilities  O.-  3.97  0.91Tr-  4.0-2  0.69"  2._9_8  0_.90  5.63  0.89  ..  5.57  0764"  3_  90-  038  4.26  03"  3.90  021  2.32
Construction  -0.79  8.84  -0.80  8.93  -0.96  10.51  -. 70  12.60  -0.70  12.58  -0.94"  16.32  4-70  22.38  -0.69  22.27  48  27.72
Commercial  4.11  2.90  -0.11  2.82  -0.20  5.09  0.03  1.02  0.03  0.98  -015  5.48  01t4  7.98  0.14  7.77  -0.09..  4.83
Economic  Significance:  10.66%  11.16%  9.59%  7.50%  7.83%  1.93%  5=23%  5.20%  -0.49%
SIZE x2  (%A)__  _  __  ___  _  __  _  _  _  __  _  _
Economic Significance:  123.4%  106.9%  61.78%
MULTIPLE  0 to  I (%A)  ___
Observations:  15,379  . 15,379  15,379  30,657  30,657  30,657  61,295  61,295  61,295
#,  "*,  **  represent significance at the 10%, 5%,  and 1% levels, respectively.
42Table 7:  Tests of Distressed-Bank Barriers  (NPL)  Hypotheses
Logit Regression: Dependent  Variable =  BNKNPLIO%
Smallest 25%  Smallest 50%  All Finns
(5 10,000 Pesos)  (s  33,600  Pesos)
(1)  '  '(2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (S)  (9)
Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat
Intercept  -3.45  2.63  -4.46'  2.91  - 4.10  ' 2.67  -5.05" '  8.63-  5.62"  8.29  6.31  46.25  40.70  35.65
LNSIZE  -0.08  0.53  0.02  0.14  4-0.03  0.19  0.11  1.77  0.17  2.28  0.00  0.02  0.26  21.60  0.25  18.17  0.17  10.96
DELINQ  3.20  1.06  339  1.12  2.43  1.79  2.05  1.51  1 .42.  3.49  -. 16  2.77
LNSIZE*DELINQ  -0.32  0.90  40.34  0.94  -0.23  1.56  -0.18  1.22  0.18  5.23  0.17  4.63
MULTIPLE  _.  l-O=  6.61  03_  t  9.91  0.83-  _12.61
Agriculture  4  . 71  2.44  0.66  2.27  4  .2-'  2.80  4.98  - I ...  4.85  123...  5.43  4.52  6.30  0.48  5.77  4  .57  6.86
Fishing  -11.08  0.02  -11.11  0.02  -11.21  0.03  -11 .15  0.04  -11.15  0.04  -11.1  5  0.04  -1.40  1.39  -1.41  1.40  -1.52  t.51
Mining  -1.51  1.50  -1.57  1.56  -2.02  2.00  -1.20  2.07  -1.23  2.11  2.78  0.11  0.84  0.14  1.10  0.00  0.00
Utilities  -0.24  0.24  40.22  0.22  -0.58  0.57  0.58  1.27  0.60  1.32  0.30  0.65  4.09  0.42  0.01  0.04  -0.03  0.15
Construction  -0.56  1.44  -0.57  1.47  -0.74-  1.89  -0.04  0.23  -0.05  0.26  -0.23  1.23  3.22  0.23  3.02  0i  .5  1.94
Commercial  -0.04  0.24  -0.03  0.19  -0.14  0.91  4  18  1.72  4.17  1.65  3.31  0.01  0.25  0.03  0.50  4. 1  4  2.43
Economic Significance:  -5.32%  -2.21%  -5.71%  7.79%  9.35%  -2.06%  19.16%/o  20.67%  14.22%
SIZE x2 (-/A)  _________
Economic Significance:  138.3%  102.3%  46.40%
MULTIPLE 0 to I (  __KA)
Observations:  -15,379  15,379-  - 1  30,657 -_  30,6S7  30,657  61,295  61,295  _61,295
*, **, *e  represent  significance  at the  10%, 5%, and  1% levels, respectively.
43Table 8:  Tests of Distressed-Bank  Barriers (LEV) Hypothesis
Logit Regression:  Dependent  Variable=  BNKLEVIO%
Smallest 25%  Smallest 50%  All Firms
(< 10,000 Pesos)  (5 33,600 Pesos)
(I)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat
Intercept  0.84 "  2.09  1.28  2.87  142"  3.1  8  -1.20  6.43  -1.41  6.82  4.65  3.07  -2.37"'  40.27  -2.45'  38.79  -1.86..  27.54
LN  SIZE  -0.27"  5.66  -0.32  6.14  -0.34  6.53  -0.03  1.58  -0.01  0.36  -0.10  4.43  0.08  15.48  0.0  16.15  0.02  2.34
DELINQ  . - 2.60" 2.46  -2.5  2.41  =  I1  5  2.40  9  1.94  4.45  5.07
LNSIZE*DELINQ  0.32  2.55  0.31"  2.51  -0.13  2.42  4.1'  1.88  0 .09  5.22  10  .58
MULTIPLE  - 0.50  8.02  . 17.91  =  0  . 65  26.34
Agriculture  -0.51  6-1.  11.05  I.12  11.68  -0.43  1.51  4.97  15.14  1  16.56  4I  *  223  -0  16.71  -0.64..  19.25
Fishing  ___2.22  2.13  -11.34  0.08  -11.45  0.08  1.40  1.38  -2.23  2.21  229  0.46  1.04  036  1.43  -0.44  176
Miming  -0.48  0.47  -I .31"'  5.34  - '  6  .51  6.10  0.24  0.47  -0.  82  5.72  7-1.09  7.49  023'  1.99  -0 11'  1 78  -0.25"4  4.19
Utilities  -12.56  0.02  -0.23  0.76  -0.37  1.21  0.06  0.06  -0.06  0.31  -0.25  1.21  44  2.01  0.06  0.61  0.00  0.03
Construction  0.  53  1.40  - 1  .47  9.01  - I  .54  9.45  0.10  0.32  -1  .0  11.52  vi;  12.98  0.08  0.97  10.71  0.52  '  13,00
Conimercial  -1.19'  3.28  0.23  5.09  0.19'_  420  -08  3.66  8.73  0.18  5.52  1.89  _______  20.53  _  14.22
Econiomic  Significance:  -14.44%  -14.30%  -15.38%  -1.70%  -1.82%  -6.50%  41.15%  4.28%  0.23%
SIZE x2 (%A)
Economic Significance:  53.19%/.  61.22%  36.78%
MULTIPLE 0 to I ('/.A)  _  _  _  ____  __
Observations:  15,379  _  15,379  15,379  _  30,657  30,657  30,657  _  _  61,295  1  61,295  _  61,295
* **  **  represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%  levels, respectively.
44Table 9:  Tests of Distressed-Bank  Barriers (ROE) Hypothesis
Logit Regression: Dependent Variable =  BNKROE10%
Smallest 25%  Smallest 50%  All Firms
(< 10,000 Pesos)  (￿  33,600 Pesos)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat
Intercept  . 3.02  1.81  -3  .99  1.48  6.58  6.25  4  .86  -6  63.88  1 8  59.82  -11.70  57.72
LNSIZE  0.21  0.80  -0.05  0.15  -0.19  0.59  0. 18  165  25  1.95  0.04  0,28  0.64  467.49  0  45.3  0.61  39.21
DELINQ  ____  -8.10  1.54  -8.12  1.52  2.88  1.19  2.48  1.03  7___  .667r  2.71  2.20"'  3.48
LNSIZE*DELINQ  1.03  1  i.69  1.05  1.69  -0.28  1.09  -0.23  0.88  -0.13  _  2.50  -0.16  }3.18
MULTIPLE  1.70'  6.73  1  I.37  7.72  80.75  8.40
Agriculture  -1.06  11.12  -0.44  1.02  -0.68  1.58  97  15.13  -0.41  1.43  -0.56.  1.96  .54  16.42  -0.16  2.09  -0.22  2.84
Fishing  -11.34  0.08  2.12-  2.02  1.69  1.56  -2.22  2.20  1.38  1.36  1.24  1.21  -0.36  1.43  0.47  1.07  0.38  0.86
Mining  -1.30..  5.31  -0.57  0.56  -1.29  1.27  -0.82"  5.69  0.22  0.43  -0.28  0.54  -0.10'  1.65  3  1.94  0.15  1.33
Utilities  -0.24  0.78  -12.45  0.02  -12.75  0.02  -0.06  0.28  0.08  0.07  -0.32  0.32  0.09  0.84  -0.45  2.08  -0.46"  2.11
Construction  -1.47-  9.01  0.52  1.36  0.26  0.68  -1.04.'  11.53  0.09  0.31  -0.14  0.46  -0.43  10.78  0.08  0.99  0.04  0.51
Commercial  0.23..  507  -1.1 - 3.23  -1.40'  3.87  02;  8.75  -0.78  3.64  .1.04..  4.82  0_43  20.63  0.12  1.96  0.00  0.08
Economic Significance:  15.58%  8.61%  -1.16%  13.22%  14.99%  2.87%  54.02%  53.95%  48.39%
SIZE  x2  (%A)__  _  __  _  __  _  __  _  __  _  _
Economic Significance:  253.9%  142.1%  42.17%
MULTIPLE 0  1  (%A)  _  _  _
Obsernations:  1  ___79  15.379  _  1579  1  30,657  1  30,657  30  ,657  61,295  61,295  61,295
,*, **,  "'*"  represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
45Table 10: Tests of SinLle-Bank  Firm Opacity and Multiple-Bank  Distress  Hypotheses
Logit Regression:  Dependent  Variable =  MULT
Smallest 25%  Smallest 50%  All Firms
(s  10,000  Pesos)  (S 33,600  Pesos)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat
Intercept  -6.34"'  12.55  -5.75"'  10.53  -58  ..  10.63  :TO.0"  47.46  10;15.  44.04  -1i0.3.  44.31  -8.88  113.94  87  105.25  -8.93  104.5
LNSIZE  _  _  A  0.4  7.00  0.35  5.46  0.34  '  5.41  0.84  37.89  0.86  35.47  0_8_..  35.52  104.12  96.01  . 95.91
DELINQ  -3.39  2.30  -3.42  2.32  0.40  0.68  0.31  0,52  -0.12  0.55  -0.11  0.53
LNSIZE*DELINQ  __0.36  2.12  0.37  2.13  -0.09  1.44  -0.08  1.30  ___4.  04r  1.76  -. 04  1.81
BNKNPLIO/PRI  0.-17  1.98  0_24...  4.77  0  12  3.55
BNKLEVIO%PRI  - 0.61  2.90  058  58  441  =  0.30  3.44
BNKROEIOO%PRI  0.95  2.76  0.8_1_  3.53  _  0.03  0.23
FOREIGNPRI  0.37  6.44  0.3  6.59  O41"  6.85  0.40  11.73  0.41  . 11.87  12.64  0.31"'  13.49  0.32  13.77  0.34 "  14.28
BNKASSETIO%PRI  000  0.03  0.01  0.15  0.08  1.27  0.13  3.74  0.13  3.98  0.21'  5.87  0*16  7.09  0.16-  720  8.20
Agriculture  1.21  15.98  15.74  4  15.96  .98  2143  0.95  20.60  1.0  2132  30.25  2892  . 29.18
Fishing  3.62  3.17  1.67  3.27  1.66  3.21  0.73  2.00  0.72  1L98  0.74  2.03  0  3.19  - 3.21  0.75  3.26
Minng  2.16  16.81  2.20  16.98  -2.21''  17.03  1.90  20.42  1.93  20.57  1T94  20.64  1.76  25.26  6  1.78"  25.41  1.78  25.40
Utilities  ;r  7.35  1  .79"'  7.34  1.80"'  7.37  91.  5  6"'.  1  . 53"'  8.86  8.79  1.09"'39.07  1.05"'  8.69  1.04"'58.67
Construction  ...  12.38  I 19  12.41  1.22  12.60  T  1i  19.51  11  -i  19.66  I  .13  19.94  0.89  24.25  0.90  24.56  0.9  24.67
Commercial  0.99_  17.29  0.98  17.25  0.99'  '  17.38  1.14 '  34.89  34.55  1.14  34.71  1.26'  57.42  1.26"'  57.07  1.26'  57.10
Economic Significance:  27.70%  27.65%  27.03%  53.25%  53.59%  53.71%  28.24%  28.38%  28.38%
SIZE x2 (%A)  _  _  __.
Observations:  15,379  15,379  15,379  30,657  30,657  30,657  61,295  61,295  61,295
*,'~ *,  +  represent significance at the 10%,  5%, and 1%  levels, respectively.
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